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Special Counsel Robert Mueller, a number of congressional com­mittees and one or more grand 
juries are actively investigating per­
sons associated with President Don­
ald Trump's presidential campaign 
and administration for their complic­
ity, if any, in Russia's interference in 
the 2016 election. 
When the president or persons 
working with the president are under 
investigations such as these, the doc­
trine of executive privilege - which 
entitles the president to keep confi­
dential certain communications to 
and from his advisers - inevitably be­
comes relevant. 
Indeed, multiple witnesses in the 
Russia investigation have already re­
fused to answer congressional ques­
tions on the grounds that they do not 
want to compromise the president's 
ability to claim executive privilege. 
So where does the doctrine of ex­
ecutive privilege come from? And 
what are its boundaries? 
Let's start by discussing the role 
privileges play in the law. Privileges 
bar investigators from obtaining in­
formation from certain sources. They 
are grounded in the notion that, 
within certain relationships and in 
certain situations, the public's inter­
est in obtaining information is not as 
important as protecting privacy, au­
tonomy, and free and open communi­
cation. 
SEE CONSTITUTION 03 
Court frrst recognized doctrine of executive privilege in U.S. v. Nixon 
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Critically, privileges pro­
tect specified individuals and 
relationships, but not the in­
formation itself. Investigators 
remain free to obtain the in­
formation they are seeking 
from any unprivileged 
source. Thus, a criminal de­
fense attorney will not dis­
close whether a client dis­
cussed the whereabouts of a 
weapon used in a crime. But 
that does not prevent the 
prosecutor from discovering 
the weapon's location 
through other means. 
Most privileges are rooted 
in federal or state statutory 
or common law. Familiar 
statutory and common-law 
privileges include the just­
mentioned attorney-client 
privilege, the spousal privi­
lege, the doctor-patient privi­
lege and the clergy privilege. 
But some privileges derive 
from the United States Con­
stitution. Most famously, the 
Fifth Amendment contains a 
privilege against self-incrimi­
nation that, among other 
things, entitles a criminal de­
fendant to decline to testify 
at trial. Also, article one's 
speech and debate clause 
protects members of 
Congress (and their aides) 
from having evidence of their 
"legislative acts" used 
against them in criminal or 
civil proceedings. 
Executive privilege is like 
these latter privileges in that 
its origins lie in the Constitu­
tion. But it is unlike these 
privileges in that there is no 
explicit textual basis for it in 
the Constitution. Rather, the 
Supreme Court has justified 
it as a necessary, if implicit, 
feature of our separation of 
powers - one that protects 
the presidency from unwar­
ranted intrusions by the Leg­
islature or judiciary. 
Ironically, the case in 
which the Supreme Court 
first explicitly recognized the 
doctrine of executive privi­
lege, United States v. Ni.xon, 
is one of the foremost exam­
ples of the judiciary asserting 
its supremacy vis-a-vis the 
other branches in interpret­
ing the Constitution. 
The Nixon decision was 
handed down on July 25, 
1974. Itwas the culmination 
of a long battle over whether 
the president was obliged to 
provide a special prosecutor 
with tape recordings of Oval 
Office conversations about 
how to handle the fallout 
from the June 17, 1972, bur­
glary of Democratic National 
Committee headquarters in 
Washington's Watergate of­
fice complex. 
President Nixon made two 
arguments in support of with­
holding the tapes. First, he 
claimed an absolute presi­
dential entitlement - not sub­
ject to court review - to keep 
private any communication 
he made or received in the 
discharge of his duties. The 
Supreme Court rejected this 
argument, holding that it was 
the court's prerogative, not 
the president's, to say what if 
anything the Constitution 
permits the president to 
shield from investigators 
seeking evidence of a crime. 
Second, he made an alter­
native argument that, even if 
the president lacks an abso­
lute entitlement to withhold 
presidential communications, 
the court should recognize 
that the president has a con­
stitutional entitlement - that 
is, a constitutional executive 
privilege - to withhold "confi­
dential" communications 
made or received in the dis­
charge of his duties. 
The court accepted this 
second argument, in part. 
The court agreed that, even 
though the Constitution does 
not mention executive privi­
lege, our constitutional struc­
ture implies a presidential 
entitlement to withhold confi­
dential communications from 
investigators in ordinary cir­
cumstances. Otherwise, the 
president and his aides "may 
well temper candor with a 
concern for appearances and 
for their own interests to the 
detriment of the decision­
making process." 
But, the court further 
held, the interests underlying 
this qualified executive privi­
lege are outweighed by the 
judicial branch's interest do­
ing justice in criminal prose­
cutions - at least in cases 
where there has been no ad­
ditional showing of a need to 
protect military, diplomatic or 
national security secrets. 
The court ordered that the 
tapes be produced. The pres­
ident complied and simulta­
neously made them public. 
The tapes showed that he 
had attempted to interfere 
with the FBl's investigation 
of the Watergate burglary. 
Three days after disclosure, 
on August 9, 1974, President 
Nixon became the first and 
only president to resign from 
office. 
Since the Ni.xon decision, 
the Supreme Court has con­
sidered an issue of executive 
privilege only once. In 2004, 
while reviewing preliminary 
procedural rulings in a civil 
lawsuit seeking to force dis­
closure of members of an en­
ergy task force chaired by 
Vice President Dick Cheney, 
the court discussed executive 
privilege and made clear that 
it is significantly more pro­
tective of the president's pri­
vacy in the civil context than 
in the criminal context. But 
the court did not resolve 
whether the doctrine applied; 
it simply remanded the case 
for further consideration. 
So as matters now stand, 
we know that the Constitu­
tion provides the president 
with a privilege to withhold 
confidential communications 
from investigators. The privi­
leged is qualified, however, 
and is significantly less likely 
to apply in the context of a 
criminal investigation than in 
other contexts. As the Russia 
investigation proceeds, it will 
be interesting to see whether 
President Trump formally in­
vokes executive privilege 
and, ifhe does, whether the 
courts uphold his claim. 
(John Greabe teaches con­
stitutional law and related 
subjects at the University of 
New Hampshire Sc1wol of 
Law. He also serves on the 
board oftrustees ofthe New 
Hampshire Institute for 
Civics Edu.cation.) 
